POLITICAL PARTIES Part 3 LIMITING THE EFFECTS OF THE IRON LAW

 

One of Michels observations is undoubtedly true. Only a minority is ever involved. But this fact does not mean the “iron law” is inevitable. Cooperatives or strata councils are run by a small group and usually a minority attends the mass meetings. As long as these groups are governed according to the wishes of the membership, this minority situation holds sway. However, should the executive decide to act contrary to the wishes of the membership, people come out of the woodwork, vote down the proposal and elect a new executive. These changes can occur as long as the structure of the organization allows it. If there are clauses in the organizations constitution that limit the powers of the membership, then the leadership will have its way, and the iron law is functioning.

Here are two examples, one positive, one negative. A Vancouver credit union was taken over by individuals who used the institution for speculation in real estate. Members rallied and eventually voted out the speculators and returned the institution to its original mandate. Mountain Equipment Coop was taken over by a group that grossly overextended the business leading to bankrupsy. They decided to sell the coop to an American corporation. The membership revolted and tried to stop this. But unfortunately there was a clause that allowed the leadership to ignore the the membership and so the coop was sold, in spite of the membership's wishes. Hence structure matters and the iron law can be offset.

Michels lumps syndicalism in with regular trade unions and political parties as being subject to the iron law. We have to remember that when he wrote POLITICAL PARTIES the syndicalist movement was only about sixteen years old. Later syndicalists would learn from the mistakes of the early movements. The French CGT soon developed a self-perpetuating leadership. Leon Jouhaux led the union for 40 years and other syndicalist leaders spent decades in office.

Later syndicalist unions like the IWW introduced term limits to prevent the formation of a permanent leadership clique. One's office was limited to two terms of a year, and then you could not run again for five years. Michels complaint might be that term limits would harm the organization by eliminating skilled experienced leaders. But these people did not disappear. They were always there for advice if needed, and furthermore assumed other important, but non-executive roles. These included traveling delegates,organizers, public speakers, and writers. Like Indigenous Elders, they had input, but no executive power.

Michels wrote of how the party or union, to be effective needed certain skilled, educated individuals. These became the core of the bureaucracy and eventually led to a more conservative outlook on the part of the institution. The IWW simply contracted lawyers and accountants, using them for their advice and skills, but not making them part of the union structure.

Throughout the history of the IWW various groups have tried to take over the organization, and thus establish elite control, but have never succeeded. The reason for this failure is the union structure. It is first and foremost highly decentralized. Each branch is semi-autonomous. The only way the IWW could pull a branch charter (dissolving the branch) would be if the group acted totally contrary to the constitution of the union. Each branch freely elects its officers and delegates on an annual basis. Each year there is a Convention of the union and each branch elects delegates to it, the number dependent upon the size of the branch. The role of the Convention delegate is to carry out the will of the branch they represent. There are also term limits as to convention delegates. The Convention does not decide the union policies. They merely discuss the proposed amendments and policies – which have been sent in by the membership – and develop them into a workable “package” that the membership as a whole – by secret ballot – will then vote on later that year at the same time they also vote in the new General Executive Board. Hence the IWW, and similar syndicalist unions, have avoided the rule of a clique, the formation of a bureaucracy and the eventual rejection of its radical syndicalist policies for conservative unionism. At the same time, it is not a fossil from 1905, but has changed as is needed, without forgetting its essential attributes.

As well as the IWW there is also the example of the International Typographical Union. Seymour Martin Lipset analyzed this union in UNION DEMOCRACY. A number of factors counter-acted the iron law. “The first and perhaps most important has to do with the way the union was founded. Unlike many other unions... organized from the top down, the ITU had a number of large, strong, local unions who valued their autonomy, which existed long before the international was formed. This local autonomy was strengthened by the economy of the printing industry which operated in largely local and regional markets... Large locals continued to jealously guard this autonomy against encroachments by international officers. Second, the existence of factions helped place a check on the oligarchic tendencies that existed at the national headquarters. Leaders that are unchecked tend to develop larger salaries and more sumptuous lifestyles, making them unwilling to go back to their previous jobs. But with a powerful out faction ready to expose profligacy, no leaders dared take overly generous personal remuneration.” 1.

The social movements of the 21^st Century practice both “talking circles” and consensus. Of course, these tend to be ad hoc rather than permanent organizations, but it is not difficult to see how these procedures can counteract the iron law. By consensus, I mean “modified consensus” - not full consensus where one individual can block the proceedings, a situation untenable in large gatherings. The talking circle entails everyone having input, no one can hold down the floor as speaking time is limited, and no one may speak again until all others have. With consensus, the only policies adopted are those that have the overwhelming agreement of the whole group. It is not hard to see how such methods when used in permanent organizations would prevent the formation of dominant cliques and the imposition of policies contrary to the wishes of the membership.

Anarchists did not need Michels to tell them about the problems of organization. Indeed, they knew about the “iron law” well before it was coined as a term. It is precisely methods of organization that separated the Marxian socialists from the libertarian socialists. Socialist and Marxist Leninist groups and parties have for some strange reason ignored POLITICAL PARTIES. The result has been an on-going move toward the right among mass-based parties, cultism and/or factionalism among the smaller groups. None seem able to question the structure or procedures of their organizations. They search for excuses outside of their sect, but never themselves. Hence they are doomed to be either capitalist reformists or generals without an army.

The German Green Party initially was aware of the problems of organization, being influenced by anarchism. However, the rotation of MPs, decentralization and consensus seemed incompatible with a functioning parliamentary party. Thus, the Greens moved in the direction of a more conventional form of internal politics. The Green experience indicates that the parliamentary system is ultimately incompatible with a more developed and inclusive form of democracy.

1. https://www.liquisearch.com/iron_law_of_oligarchy/examples_and_exceptions

Part 2 Robert Michels - POLITICAL PARTIES The Errors of “POLITICAL PARTIES”

There are a number of assumptions made by Michels which are not based upon empirical evidence and are little better than elitist prejudices, or at best, may have been true at the time, but are no longer the case today. There is a “pathology of the crowd” and the “masses incapable of most necessary resolutions.” 25 In the “lower stages of civilization, tyranny dominant.” 32 As we know from anthropology, societies without the state tend toward consensus and are not tyrannies.

Millions cannot make decisions without intermediaries. Assemblies of thousands have the “gravest difficulties”. (Tell that to the Indignados) 26 Hence the need for delegates to represent the mass” 27(A confusion between representation and delegation) 25 

 

“A strong organization needs a strong leadership.” 36 A “fighting party needs a hierarchical structure” as “liberty must yield to the need for prompt action.” and “democracy incompatible with strategic promptness.” 42 All are assumptions and are counter-acted by evidence, such as the anarchist militias in Spain, the Zapatistas, the Kurdish militias etc.

 

For most people the relationship of the “good of the individual and the good of the collectivity... little developed.” which is why parties reject referenda as a means of safeguarding democracy.” 42 This was written two years before tens of millions of men went off to get themselves killed in a misguided, but nonetheless authentic desire to sacrifice themselves for the national collectivity.

The majority are indifferent, only a minority take part in party decisions. 50

(Are they really indifferent, or just happy with the way the organization functions? About 90% of the IWW members do not bother to vote in the annual elections – yet these same members are active in activities of their branches.)

 

There is a huge difference of educational level among members, giving rise for a need for leadership. 53 (This may have been true in the past, but part of today's lack of deference toward authority is rooted in the fact that many of us are better educated than our masters.) 53

The masses have a need to “prostrate themselves” before their leaders, which is the remains of a “religious need.” 67. This may have been true to an extent in the past, but today – other than the far-right – witness the adulation of Trump – most people have a fairly cynical view of their wannabe leaders.

 

The anarchists are “enemies of all organization.” 81 Not that old cliché again!

Bernstein is quoted as evidence. He denies the average person the knowledge and ability to make “unreconstructed popular sovereignty” possible and as the masses lack a sense of responsibility, “socialism is [not] everything BY the people, but everything FOR the people.” 88. For social democracy, democracy is an end, not a means. The mass must submit to the leaders, who know more than they do.” 95 Ominous! Here we have socialism stripped of its the self-managed essence. Right-wing social democracy begins to confuse state ownership with socialism.

 

Michels complains in a rather priggish way about the vast numbers of associations social democratic workers belonged to. Lacking the slightest notion of the pre-figurative – all the good stuff has to wait for the Party taking power – he sees this associationalism – today seen as one of the high points of German social democracy - as dangerously “petty-bourgeois.” This is from the guy who ten years later supports Mussolini! 289

 

Michels refers to syndicalism's attempts to overcome the iron law by reducing the control of a minority over the union. He criticizes this attempt by confusing delegation and representation, asking how can the problems of organization be overcome by an antidote rooted in representation? 340 He sees the oligarchic nature of French syndicalism in the lack on initiative of the working classes. They don't move unless told to by the union. Only a handful of union members subscribe to the CGT press. 354 But activists are always a minority, everywhere. This is only a problem if this minority becomes a self-perpetuating elite, or tries to force itself boss-like upon the mass of workers.

 

He assumes that social wealth could only be administered by a bureaucracy which leads to the impossibility of a society without classes, as the adminstrators end up with the power of a capitalist. These administrators would use their power and relative wealth compared to the workers to secure the same positions for their children. 383 Michels has seemingly no conception of self-management, and the use of decentralization and federalism to minimize the possibility of a centralized bureaucracy forming.

 

He reiterates Marx's complaint about the position of the Federal Council anarchists on the need to send delegates to committees. According to Marx, these delegates would “be invested with an authoritative character.” 359 This is pure obfuscation, since delegates carry out the will of the assembly and can be recalled by the assembly.

NEXT - Part 3 LIMITING THE EFFECTS OF THE IRON LAW

THE FEMINIZATION OF THE WORKING CLASS AND ITS POLITICAL IMPACT

 

Based on “Quelle coalition face au bloc bourgeois?” By Pierre Rimbert, Monde Diplomatique, February 2022

Rimbert points out that a major transformation of French society has been largely ignored. Within the last 50 years the working classes have become in the majority, women. In 1970 38% of women were workers and the same percent were actively involved in the economy. (As workers, owners, petty bourgeois etc)

By 2020 48.5% of these “actives” and 52% of the working classes were women. In 1970 women aged 25-59 made up 50% of the actives compared to 95% of the men. Today 82% of women are actives and 91.9 % of the men.

As for the class structure of France, some 20% of the active population are bourgeois, petty bourgeois and managerial class. Almost half of the actives are blue collars of which 80% are male. Of the lower wage, less educated white collars 75% are women. Of the 10% of the actives who are educated white collar workers (teachers, nurses, techs etc) these are in the majority women.

Over the last 25 or more years the French economy has undergone a transformation. A loss of blue collar employment and many white collar office workers, bank clerks etc. There has been a host of new “care” jobs such as child care, aides in old age homes, hospital and teaching auxiliaries, cleaners, etc. There is a second, pre-existing group of government employees, nurses, teachers and technicians. (the latter three professions have also expanded.) The two groups make up 60% of white collar workers and are overwhelmingly women. People have also commented on how the gilet jaune movement had a large number of women from both groups of white collar workers.

The “care” section is also where one finds a great number of immigrant workers. It should be noted that the female workers suffer from much greater precarity than men, have lower wages, are shunted into part time without benefits, etc.

At the same time the Covid lock downs have made everyone aware of how important these care jobs and other essential services, are – which are mainly staffed by women.

Rimbert believes that for the left to reconquer lost ground, it must focus on these women workers, especially of the essential services. The French left (and by extension elsewhere, since these developments are not unique to France) should focus more on this growing sector of the class and less upon its dying sector.

There has been a fair amount of moaning among the Anglosphere left about “where is the working class and why don't they like us anymore?” (by which they seem to mean blue collars.) Well, Jacobin and Tribune, put away your hankies – here is your working class!

Robert Michels and the Social Democratic Parties.

 The social democratic parties started out in the late 19^th century as socialist, by which they meant public ownership and democratic control of the major industries. In time their, actual practice devolved into one of gradual social reform and the socialist goal was restricted to an indefinite future. In the 1950s, even this “Sunday sermon socialism” was dropped, as well as the notion of class struggle, and the Marxist analysis of capitalism. Social democracy was reduced to liberal reformism. In the 1990s reformism was tossed aside, and most social democratic parties became centrist parties with neoliberal economics combined with a touch of social progressivism. (Sort of “We support feminism, but are cutting funding to your Woman's Centre.”) The socialists who all along the way resisted these developments, had a difficult time of it, being marginalized, purged, or in the case of Rosa Luxemburg, murdered.

Here in Canada there was a similar trajectory. (Except for the part about murder.) The CCF started out as a socialist party, but the right wing soon isolated the socialists. In 1956 they dropped all reference to socialism. Workers education and any concept of class had gone by the board earlier. The CCF relaunched itself as the liberal reformist NDP. Troublesome socialists were isolated or driven out, the most infamous example being the purge of the Waffle Group. While the NDP never took power federally, it had a number of provincial governments and important reforms were enacted. During the 1990s these same NDP governments went neoliberal and turned on their supporters, cutting back social services, privatizing, and even stooping to mass arrests of environmental protestors.

How do you explain this sad story? The inevitable corruption of leaders or some innate tendency toward moderation are superficial explanations. The problem must be structural. The social scientist who closely examined the structure of the social democratic parties and how this effected their political evolution is found in Robert Michels and his ground breaking 1911 study, POLITICAL PARTIES.(Hearst International Library, NYC, 1915)

While POLITICAL PARTIES was aimed at social democracy, it also applies to trade unions and any other organization with similar internal structures. What is most remarkable for me about his study is the lack of effect upon the internal policies of these organizations. They have continued to stumble on, blithely unaware it seems, of any need to counter-act this “iron law of oligarchy.” And they wonder why they have lost support...

Michels begins with the rather obvious observation that a workers movement requires organization, since workers are defenseless in isolation. But organization brings “dangers in its train.” p. 22 “Political organization leads to power, and this power is always conservative.” 366 “Where delegated authority is of brief duration, representation is possible. But permanent representation will always be the exercise of dominion... over the represented.” 40

The embourgeoisification of social democracy is not, as many claimed back in 1910, the result of bourgeois joining the party, but rather the changes that take place within the working class leadership, due to the nature of the party structure. 270

As the party grows, bureaucracy is needed and this involves become paid positions. Such positions separate the working class militants who take on these roles from the class itself. They are now secure party functionaries and not “dirt-beneath-their nails” workers subject to the whims of the capitalists. Bureaucracy leads to further centralization and the formation of a conservative bureaucratic grouping. 116

The bigger the organization, the more specialization. The more specialization, the less ability to see the “big picture” and the less desire to study the underlying problems of society. Specialization leads to philistinism, anti-intellectualism, and a renunciation of the movement's final goals. 188 As bureaucracy increases, the cultural and internationalist aspects of socialism declines. As a result [the] “mechanism becomes an end in itself.” 187

This need for technical experts, creates an elite. Party leaders begin to make decisions on their own without consulting the rank and file which is indicative of a decline in democracy. Pps. 32, 34 Leaders tend to have oratorical ability. Educated people who do not possess these skills are thus side-lined. 70. A mediocre intellect who is a good speaker or has charm and charisma takes precedence in the party and this adds to its intellectual decline. Such leaders tend to have a low opinion of the masses. The masses supposed incompetence is then used to justify further exclusion from party business. 151

MPs soon become leaders of the party and this leads to further erosion of rank and file control, as MPs are elected for long terms and by electors and not party members. 136 Elected representatives often become “lifelong incumbents” thus increasing their control. 43. Party members and supporters tend to believe that the parliamentary way the only way and thus do not wish to make life difficult for MPs by challenging them to any extent. 138 The MPs think they are superior to the Party Congress and claim increasing autonomy. They then restrict what can be voted on at the Congress, out of fear for their own positions. Threats of resignation of office are also used as hammer to force one's position upon the party. 43 The leadership is in danger of becoming “a closed corporation cut off from the party.” 140-141

Development of profession politicians and party leaders increases over time, and “all sense of solidarity lost” toward the working class. 81. The parliamentary experience in manipulative politics is used within the party against dissidents. p. 84 Leaders become a major source of power and make sure of this by making themselves indispensable. 86 A very strong loyalty to leaders develops which is stronger than the loyalty felt toward to government officials among the masses. Inertia plays a role as well, since the leadership is “already constituted.” Leadership comes less from election by the masses, not to mention individuals rising from them, and more one of cooptation from a narrow group acceptable to the party leaders. 98-104

Radically changing policies within a party is a difficult and disruptive process, that almost always fails. Eliminating a leader unpopular with the ranks is considered a crime by the party bosses, and if forced to step down, this unpopular person is given a new post by the leadership. 158 Wherever opposition arises within a party, it is attacked as a result of intrigue, and slandered as an attempt to destroy the party. The leaders claim to be under attack and demand the confidence of the members. Criticism of leaders seen as an attack on the party. This is similar to governments claiming that demonstrators are attacking constituted authority, when all they seek are reforms. 224 “Every autonomous movement... signifies a profound discordance with the... leaders... Apart from such transient interruptions the.. normal development... will impress... an indelible stamp of conservatism.” 162

Party members do become aware of the oligarchical nature of their organization. But “far from recognizing the real fount of oligarchical evil in the centralization of power... they often consider that the best means of counteracting [it] is to intensify this very centralization.” 15 This is seen in Marxist Leninist organizations especially.

Michels confuses “representation” with “delegation” throughout his study, and the real problem lies with the former. The representative is elected for a given term, cannot be easily removed and as a group they are quite autonomous in their decision making. Such a situation combined with the party bureaucracy can only give rise to a self-perpetuating clique that can only be removed from power with a great deal of effort which is usually highly damaging to the party.

Numbers in the text refer to the page numbers of POLITICAL PARTIES

PART TWO will examine the flaws in Michel's analysis and discuss ways of overcoming the “iron law of oligarchy.”